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ABSTRACT
The integrity of lawyers’ trust accounts has come under scrutiny in the last few
years. There are strong possibilities of information technology security breaches
happening within the firms, either accidental or deliberate. The damage caused by
these security breaches could be extreme. For example, a trust account fund in an
Australian law firm was misused in a security breach in which Telstra charged
A$50,000 for phone usage, mainly for ISD calls to Hong Kong. Our study
involved interviewing principals of ten law companies to find out solicitors’
attitudes to computer security and the possibility of breaches of their trust
accounts. We simultaneously carried out a survey to see if the trends identified in
our case-studies could be backed up with broader quantitative data. We have also
conducted in-depth interviews of five trust account regulators from the Law
society of South Australia to know their view points on security threats on trust
accounts. An overall finding highlights that law firms were not current with
technology to combat computer crime, and inadequate access control was a major
concern in safeguarding account data. Our conclusions revealed the urgent need
for law firms to adopt security controls, implement information security policies
and procedures and obtain cooperation from management to communicate these
policies to staff..
Keywords: Information Security, Information Security Management, Computer
crime, Trust account.
1. INTRODUCTION
Law firms are no exception to the trend towards computerized information
infrastructures, particularly because the very nature of their business is collecting
and storing highly confidential client data. One area of law firm activity which
has come under intense security is the integrity of trust accounts. Law firms
operate and maintain trust accounts on behalf of investors or depositors, to be
used in the trustees’ interests at the trustees’ request. Trust accounts basically hold
public money. Many incidences of trust account fraud reported over the last two
decades clearly indicate that trust accounts have been misused and manipulated in
a range of ways. The following incidents provide some of the best examples of
trust account vulnerability, and ensuing fraud, in the public domain.
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A lawyer in Canada was found guilty in 2000 of failing to account to
various clients for trust monies totaling C$1,195,201. Between 1996
and 2000 he transferred the total amount of C$1,871,526 from his
firm’s trust account (The Law Society of Upper Canada 2005).



A lawyer in Toronto, Canada, misappropriated the sum of C$605,000
from funds he held in trust on behalf of one of his clients (The Law
Society of Upper Canada, 2005).



A solicitor in the United Kingdom stole £1,250,000 from a client over
ten years. The cash kept in the law firm’s trust account was part of
compensation received by the client for lifetime care. The client was
immobilised below the neck and needed full time care. The solicitor
diverted money from the trust account to his personal account
(Jenkins, 2008).



Three people in Little Rock, United States of America, complained
that a total of US$732,000 was missing from their accounts. One
client claimed that US$16,000 was missing; another claimed
US$250,000 was missing; and a third claimed that US$466,000 was
missing (Mark, 2004).



An employee from a law firm in Adelaide, Australia, was charged
when A$4,500,000 was discovered missing from a trust fund. The
employee faced charges of fraud and deception. Forty-two clients had
money in that trust account. They were devastated and spent much
time investigating ways of recovering their money (The Australian,
September 12, 2006 and Sunday Mail, November 12, 2006).

These major incidents of trust account breaches in Australia and around the world
triggered the need to explore causal factors and possible preventive measures, and
became the base for our research. The Professional Standards Section of the Law
Society of South Australia also wanted to examine the overall information
security procedures in South Australian law firms, and specifically to improve the
security of the operation of trust accounts. The results and guidelines developed in
our work have helped them provide advice and training to lawyers in adopting
effective information security practices.
1.1 Computer Crime in Law Firms
Law firms are not exempt from computer crime. According to a report in the
Lawyer’s Weekly in the United Kingdom (Cooper, 2006), many incidents go
unreported because law firms are embarrassed to report them. There are strong
possibilities of IT security breaches happening within the firms, either accidental
or deliberate. The damage caused by these security breaches could be extreme.
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For example, a trust account fund in an Australian law firm was misused in a
security breach in which Telstra charged A$50,000 for phone usage, mainly for
ISD calls to Hong Kong (Cooper, 2006).
While examining employee involvement in computer related abuse within a firm,
Sakurai et al. (2003) observed that organisations are prone to employee fraud
when effective computer access controls are not in place. Two categories of
insider threats have been identified: self-motivated, or controlled by an outsider
(Choo et al, 2007). Insider threats influenced by an outsider pose the greater
danger to an organisation, as ‘with advances of communication technology, there
will be more avenues for insiders to leak sensitive documents’ (Choo 2007:
XVII). A corrupt insider in a law firm could deliberately sell confidential
information to a competitor; a situation that appears to be increasing. For
example:


In a Global State of information Security Study (2007), employees
within an organisation were considered a major source of information
security breach. The data shows that in 2006 the rate of insider attack
was 3 percent. This rose to 48 percent in 2007.



Thomson (2008) interviewed 3,596 professionals from the United
States, United Kingdom, France and Germany and found that in 75
percent of cases, breaches within companies were caused by inside
staff.

These examples highlight the fact that a great threat to law firm security arises
from within the company, whether the employee’s action is malicious or
inadvertent (Nelson and Simek, 2005). It can be difficult to discover a dishonest
professional, particularly in a sole practice law firm due to the absence of peer
supervision. Law firms are at great disadvantage especially when there is no-one
assigned to supervise the technical infrastructure, especially in the case of small
firms.
1.2 Trust Accounts, Security and Fraud
According to the Australian Legal Practice Act 1996, a trust account needs to be
created within a legal practice to hold the money which is given or paid to a
firm/legal practitioner in the course of legal practice, or the money paid for, or on
behalf of, a person/body other than the firm/practitioner – this includes transit
cheques or the money given or paid to a firm/legal practitioner for advance
payment of legal costs. All principals of a practice that handles trust money,
including sole practitioners, must hold a Practising Certificate which authorises
them to receive this money. The trust accounts must be held with an authorised
bank and separate accounts need to be established for the exclusive use of
particular clients. These accounts are referred to as ‘interest bearing accounts’ and
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are recorded in the solicitor’s Investment and Securities Register.
The Australian Financial Transactions Reports Act 1988 requires legal
practitioners to report cash transactions of A$10,000 or more. The Law Institute
of the state concerned appoints trust account inspectors who are normally
qualified accountants/solicitors. Their role is to assist practitioners in maintaining
a high standard of trust accounting for trust funds through investigation and
inspection of relevant legal practice records. Legal practitioners are required to
assist inspectors by producing legal practice records for inspection or copying,
and by providing any other information the inspector reasonably requests.
Inspectors can only disclose information acquired in the course of an inspection
for the purpose of conducting an investigation. Trust monies must be
distinguished from the practitioner’s own monies relating to the practice, which
are held in an office account.
Managing trust accounts within law practices has long been a challenging task
due to their proneness to misappropriation and mismanagement. In spite of many
legal requirements on trust deed limits and how trust funds may be invested, there
have been many instances where the trustees have breached the trust. These
breaches can be traced from the establishment of the trust accounts. This
challenge to the trust account has been a constant problem. Some of the serious
types of mishandling of trust accounts that we noted include:


Transferring from trust accounts to solicitors’ own accounts monies
which are incorrectly believed, or alleged, to be due to the solicitors’
professional charges and out of pocket expenses.



Investing clients’ money without instructions or contrary to
instructions.



Borrowing money from clients without disclosing that it is for the
solicitors’ personal use, and without advising the client to obtain
independent legal advice. (Fourth report on the legal profession,
1984).

The vulnerability of trust accounts within law practices makes them a fertile
ground for computer crime, especially insider attack. Historically, trust accounts
have been well known for abuse by internal sources such as the lawyers
themselves or employees working in a law practice. The computerisation of trust
accounts has increased the potential for computer crime and has added another
dimension of threat to their safety.
De Lacerda (2004) believes that trust account violations can happen because
‘deliberate doers’ are tempted to use/misuse the huge amount in trust or due to
poor judgment. Trust account operations reflect on a lawyer’s trustworthiness and
loyalty to the profession. The Supreme Court in the United States of America has
defined three levels of common culpability in operating trust accounts:
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1. Commingling, where there is no separate office account and trust
account.
2. Conversion, where a lawyer utilises trust money, intending to
return it.
3. Misappropriation: the deliberate misuse of funds (De Lacerda,
2004).
De Lacerda (2004) reports that one of the administrative staff of a company took
US$265,000 from the trust account over a five year period and kept the firm’s
lawyer unaware of complaints from clients. This staff member faked the lawyer’s
identity and intercepted phone calls.
Our research has attempted to explore the sources of threat to the security of the
information systems underpinning the management of trust accounts within law
firms. Without this understanding, law firms are not in a position to plan a
systematic strategy to protect their trust accounts from attack.
1.3 Association of Trust Account Fraud with Money Laundering
Trust account fraud is also widely associated with money laundering, a type of
major crime involving financial transactions. Money laundering converts illegal
money into a legal form, and the criminal enjoys the benefit of it without being
suspected by police (Anti-Money Laundering Reform Issue Paper 1, 2004).
Money laundering can be defined as: “to knowingly engage in a financial
transaction with the proceeds of some unlawful activity with the intent of
promoting or carrying on that unlawful activity or disguising the nature, location
source, ownership or control of these proceeds” (Genzman 1997). Thus, money
laundering transforms unlawful money into a usable form. The link between
money laundering and trust accounts is evident. According to Beare (2007) the
significance of a legal trust account in the context of a money laundering
operation should not be under estimated; it can be used as part of the initial first
step in converting the cash proceeds of crime into other less suspicious assets, it
can serve to help hide criminal ownership of funds. Hence, it is clear that a trust
account, which is public money, can be misused by criminals as part of the money
laundering process.
The problem of money laundering is not limited to a particular state/country or
profession; it has spread worldwide and across all professions. In the United
Kingdom, a bank complained about a sole practitioner firm from which a
fraudster withdrew £260,000 from a customer account, transferred the amount
into a trust account and then requested the law firm to transfer the money to an
offshore account (Mark, 2007). Here, responsibility for the mistake was pointed at
the law firm as it did not check the fraudster’s identity; instead, the firm had
assisted and facilitated the misconduct. This shows that trust account fraud is a
major crime, and it becomes a challenge to prevent it.
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Money launderers ‘are not stereotype criminals. They are accountants,
attorneys…and members of other legitimate professions’ (Clark, 2007). They do
not appear to be criminals but professionals dealing with customers and in
business partnerships in different fields. Further, it is noted that: solicitors
probably contributed the greatest degree of professional support and facilitation to
the activities of the launderers - such professionals would create offshore
companies; arrange for the handling of large sums of money; sign cheques with
power of attorney (Clark, 2007). Commonly known purposes for laundering are
drug trafficking and terrorism. In both situations, money is turned over several
times and generated quickly without any proof of transaction. In these types of
crimes, cash is used as the main transaction method. The laundered money is used
for other crimes while the criminals get a huge share of the proceeds in return.
Successful money laundering turns criminal money into money that can be used
for a profitable purpose. Along with major crime, money laundering also
enhances activities such as corruption and bribery. Thus the ill effects of money
laundering have economic and political implications.
Money laundering is known to enable terrorist financing (IMF, 2007). In this
case, terrorists tend to use illicit money, sourced from money laundering, for their
work. It is observed that money laundering and the financing of terrorism use
similar methods; in both the cases, the criminal makes illegitimate use of the
finance sector (IMF, 2007). When a trust account is used as a means to operate
money laundering activities, public money deposited in the trust may be utilised
for terrorism or drug trafficking purposes. Hence, understanding the root cause of
these problems and protecting trust accounts and information systems from an
early stage is the challenge for information security professionals. Effective
information security management procedures play a major role in combating
these crimes.
1.4 Information Security Management of Trust Accounts
Rapid developments occurring in the field of information technology have
benefited the management of trust accounts. Computers can make an accounting
system more efficient with consequent benefits for solicitors and clients. Most
trust accounts have been fully computerised since the mid-1980s. Currently, most
law firms have a well-developed trust account system. The solicitors are required
to obtain the Law Society’s approval to adopt such systems and a majority of
lawyers have overwhelmingly embraced this technological advancement (Fourth
Report on the Legal Profession: Solicitor’s Trust Accounts, 1984). Network and
wireless technology permits easy communication through access to the computer
systems from many locations. Whilst this is a benefit, it could also be a potential
source of threat to the trust account. The Fourth Report on the Legal Profession
(1984) clearly states that:
In some ways computerised systems can be more vulnerable to fraudulent misuse
and less capable of being subjected to effective independent scrutiny than some
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other systems. This applies especially if, for example, the system does not retain a
full history of entries on the records or allows such history to be readily falsified.
Difficult problems arise also in relation to preventing unauthorised access to
systems, and producing records in comprehensible form.
The Law Society’s 1984 report clearly indicates the vulnerability of computerised
trust accounts. However, in our literature review we have found very little data on
the ways in which law firms manage the security of information systems,
operating the trust accounts and the threats to these accounts.
2. METHODOLOGY
2.1 Research Aims
As we have indicated, there is little data on the way law firms manage
information security in a context where security breaches and fraud are welldocumented and fairly common. Despite many incidents involving serious
security breaches of trust accounts, very limited information is currently available
on the organisational environment and other possible aspects relevant to these
accounts’ security.
The study was conducted using a combination of qualitative and quantitative
research methods known as ‘mixed method/triangulation’. Case study
methodology was used to analyse and understand the issues in depth (qualitative).
Preliminary case study findings were used as a baseline to create a survey
(quantitative), which was conducted to study the extent to which these findings
were prevalent among law practices. Hence, qualitative and quantitative methods
were used to elicit rich data which aimed:


To explore the organisational environment prevailing within law
practices, and the information security practices and procedures in use
within law firms.



To study the extent to which solicitors were aware of computer crimes
and their attitude towards the security of trust accounts.



To analyse security breaches if they have occurred within trust
accounts in the past and the ways in which law firms have handled
them.



To provide an opportunity for the employees of law firms to share
their views in relation to the security management of trust accounts.

We adopted a sequential procedure for our research. It began with the qualitative
case study method, exploring case studies of law firms, interviewing both lawyers
and their staff and then Trust Account Regulators. This was followed up with the
quantitative survey method, in which questionnaires were mailed to all the law
practices who maintain trust accounts in South Australia.
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2.2 Data Collection Process
2.2.1 Pilot Study
A pilot study was conducted within three (n=3) law firms in South Australia in
order to study the suitability of a survey questionnaire, and to establish the
reliability and validity of the items included in it.
2.2.2 Sample Selection
Information presented here was based on data collected through face-to-face
interviews with the staff in charge of the three law firms in the pilot study. These
firms were selected on a purposive sampling basis using the following selection
criteria:


The law firm is located within metropolitan Adelaide.



The law firm has been established for five or more years.



The law firm has five or more employees.
2.2.3 Interview Protocol

An interview protocol consisting of four sections was used to ensure the validity
and reliability of the data collection process. The first section collected
information pertaining to the law firm’s general background, such as the number
of professional and administrative staff, and the respondents’ work experience.
The second section focused on the organisation’s IT background, such as the
number of computers in use, their accessibility, the role of IT personnel, and
adaptation of security policies and standards. The third section inquired about the
incidence of security breaches within the organisation and measures the
organisation had taken to prevent future occurrences. The final section focused on
trust accounts, incidents of mismanagement and respondents’ views on trust
account vulnerability. Based on the pilot study experience, some of the questions
had to be refined for use in the major study.
2.3 Major Study: 10 Adelaide Lawyer Case Studies
2.3.1 Sample Selection
The Law Society of South Australia then invited firms to take part in the major
study case study process. Ten firms responded positively to this letter. Thus, case
studies were conducted with ten (n=10) law firms in South Australia. A semistructured interview protocol was used to ensure the validity and reliability of the
data collection process.
The first session with each law firm participant (n=10) lasted for 40-45 minutes.
The researcher had to be an active listener and highly observant throughout the
interview process. Some participants seemed very guarded while giving
information; others seemed involved and cooperative throughout the interview. In
some situations, with regard to technical questions, the researcher had to conduct
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separate interviews with IT personnel. The researcher also had a chance to look at
the trust account authorisation procedures and documentation.
2.4 Major Study: 5 Adelaide Trust Regulators
Five interviews (case studies) were conducted at the Law Society of South
Australia. The main participants were five (n=5) trust account regulatory officers
from the Professional Standards Section of the Law Society of South Australia.
These regulatory officers are responsible for inspecting trust accounts in law firms
on a time-to-time basis. The main interview content focused on the importance of
trust accounts in a law firm, common types of breaches, different ways in which
account systems are mishandled and information security measures to overcome
these problems.
Each interview lasted for 40–45 minutes, was voice recorded and later
transformed into a text file. An interview guide was used to conduct these
interviews. The items included in the interview guide collected information
relating to:
1. Background characteristics of the respondents
2. Importance of trust accounts within the law practices
3. Common breaches the respondents had come across and their
observations relating to the details of these breaches
4. Implications of the breaches for the trust account, law firm and the
clients
5. Impact of computerisation in the mishandling of trust accounts
6. General suggestions for action to be taken to improve the overall
security of the trust accounts.
2.5 Major Study: The Survey
2.5.1 Sample Selection
All law firms located within South Australia who maintained a trust account and
were members of the Law Society of South Australia were chosen as samples for
the survey.
2.5.2 Data Collection
The survey—a self-administered questionnaire—was posted to all of these firms
with a letter stating the purpose of the research and requesting their participation
in the survey, and a consent form for participants to sign. A self-addressed,
postage paid envelope was also included to enable easy return of the surveys. In
all, the survey questionnaire was posted to 410 law firms within South Australia.
Of the 410 questionnaires posted, seventy-six (n=76) valid questionnaires were
returned. Posting the questionnaire seemed suitable and advantageous because it
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reached a vast sample population and provided much needed anonymity for the
data collection process.
2.5.3 Data Analysis
Case Studies
Case study data analysis was carried out in four stages. As stated earlier, there
were two sets of qualitative data; one set from law firms (n=10) and one set from
trust account regulators (n=5).
Stage 1: Audio Taping and Transcribing Interview Data
Interviews were audio taped during the case studies. If there was any missing
information, another call was made to maintain the uniformity of the information
collected. The audio files were transformed to text files (by transcription) as
verbatim interviews. Each case was classified using identification numbers.
Stage 2: Noting
The textual data were again classified; responses that were seen as unique to
building the study’s arguments were highlighted. In this review and noting
process, important quotes were also written down.
Stage 3: Grouping by Themes
The data collected were grouped according to themes. For example, responses
related to ‘organisational environment in the law firms’ were grouped together
and formed into tables. The responses were carefully observed and noted down
for comparison and contrast with similar themes.
Stage 4: Creating Separate Tables of Comparison and Contrast
The grouped tables were further divided into comparison and contrast information
categories. Arguments were based on important and repeated quotes, which
helped to draw inferences from the data.
Analysis of Quantitative Data
The quantitative data analysis was based on univariate analysis. In line with this
process, the questionnaires gathered from the survey respondents were arranged
in sequential number order. Responses were coded on a spreadsheet. Coded data
were entered into an SPSS (version 16.0.1) data entry sheet to generate
percentages and frequencies. This enabled the results of the study to be presented
in the form of tables with percentages, graphs, pie charts and bar charts. Openended questions were listed separately and grouped into small categories.
3. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
3.1 Background Data
Background data collected showed that the majority of respondents had more than
five years experience of working in law firms. It was presumed they were well
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versed in the procedures and operation of trust accounts. The respondents were
mainly sole principals or partners of the law firms, followed by accounting staff.
3.2 IT Resources
The 10 case studies showed that together there were a minimum of nine and a
maximum of 60 networked computers that were connected to the internet. The
number of computers in each law firm ranged from 1-35 but only 86.8 percent
were networked, and 97 percent had internet access. The majority of staff could
view the computerised databases but only a few had the privilege of actually
operating them. Accounting staff had more access privileges for the databases.
However, the findings revealed that access controls to the databases were not
strictly enforced. There was disparity among the law firms in assigning access
control rights. This was considered a major information security threat. The
findings about this issue are a warning to law firms to tighten their policies and
also to suggest that the Law Society could impose specific guidelines on access
control procedures to maintain uniformity among the firms. Both the case studies
and the survey indicated that the internet was used for communicating with
clients, research and banking purposes. The study cautions that the internet can be
a means of software attack, which could be prevented by updating technology and
regularly monitoring system security.
3.3 Computer Security Environment
It was observed in the case studies that half did not have an organisational
information security policy. Those who were said to have such policies mentioned
that the contents related to restriction and usage of computers and the internet.
There seemed to be a lack of awareness about information security standards. The
study stressed the need to educate law firms about the importance of information
security policies and standards.
Backup was another issue discussed. Backups were done regularly and kept both
onsite and offsite. Only three cases out of 10 said they had contingency plans for
business continuity without major disruption during any disastrous situation.
Similarly, only three cases were said to have regular monitoring of their networks.
This is a significant finding that stresses the need to have information security
awareness programs in the law firms.
It was noted that only 17 percent responded that they had an information security
policy and 4 percent said policies were under construction. Those who had an
information security policy said it was communicated via hard copy distribution
or through intranet web references. It was striking to know that 92 percent of
respondents did not follow any internationally accepted standards. However, it
was encouraging to note that 51 percent monitored their systems to detect abuse.
In both the survey and case study results, antivirus, firewalls and spyware were
the most commonly reported security technologies. Reusable passwords and
intrusion detection mechanisms were implemented in nearly one third of the law
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firms. It was concluded that, along with the importance of security standards and
policy, law firms need to educate staff in various IT security technology tools and
controls to prevent computer abuse.
3.4 Experience of Computer Crime
From the data, it was understood that less than 25 percent of the law firms
experienced any sort of computer crime/threat/attacks. Common attacks observed
were virus attacks, spam and server hijacking, including computer theft. Some
law firms had experienced the same type of attacks on several occasions. It was
not clear whether these firms had taken appropriate measures to prevent further
attacks. Financial gain and thrills were the main motivational factors observed by
the respondents.
3.5 Trust Accounts
Case study results revealed that all the trust accounts in the participating firms
were computerised. Access to trust account databases varied with the designation,
role and responsibility of individuals within the law firm. Most employees were
allowed to view the databases but restrictions applied to operating the accounts.
The study suggests that the Law Society could impose some standardised
regulation on accessing trust account databases. From the survey data, it was
understood that only 57 percent of the firms were computerised. It is worrying to
note that less than half of this percentage needed a password to log-in. Another
important area of vulnerability explored was authorisation procedures on trust
account cheques. Among the case studies, seven out of 10 needed only one
signatory to authorise trust account cheques; the remaining three cases needed
two partners’ signatures. It was surprising to note that accounts managers had full
authority to operate electronic transactions but were not reviewed by the firm’s
partners. The survey revealed that 87 percent of firms needed only one signature
and only 7 percent needed two peoples’ signatures. It was argued that if there
were at least two signatories on the trust account authorisation, transparency
exists and there is less chance for the signatory to misuse the trust money. It is
suggested that the Law Society could impose some uniform rules on access
control procedures and designate who could be signatories.
In all 10 cases reviewed, it was felt that the trust account was vulnerable, and that
‘internal measures needed to be tightened’ and ‘strict policies and procedures be
put in place’. In the survey, the data indicated that 11 percent thought trust
account data were altered occasionally due to human error, and when this
happened they immediately notified the Law Society. Respondents made
constructive suggestions to overcome this problem such as “to keep unauthorised
users away from accessing the databases”, “principals to authorise trust account
cheques” and “regular trust account reconciliation by the principals of the firms”.
These suggestions would be useful feedback to law firms to improve their
procedures.
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3.6 Trust Account Regulators’ Viewpoints
The five case studies carried out with trust account regulators revealed that
practitioners do make accidental errors while entering trust data, and this can lead
to major problems if not rectified immediately. Due to lack of resources, smaller
firms have to empower one person with the trust account operation; separation of
duties is not possible. In such situations, breach of trust was common. In other
instances, the law firm principal signed a blank cheque and the bookkeeper filled
in the wrong amount and used it for personal gain. In larger firms, due to work
pressure, principals did not pay much attention to trust account matters, and
administrative staff misused this situation. On other occasions, trust accounts
were hacked by an external person. Hence, it was concluded that trust accounts
have to be protected from all surrounding threats.
Implications of trust account breaches were threefold: they affected the law firms,
the law practitioners and the clients. The inefficiency of the law firms, if known to
the public, could result in loss of reputation that could potentially end a practice.
Law firms cannot underestimate the effects of a security breach and the
accompanying loss of faith. Due to a bad experience, a client would switch to
another law firm and the legal practitioner would be suspended from the practice
if found guilty of breaching the trust account. On the client’s side, the scenario
could be worse if they were not able to access the money from the trust account
when needed, or if they lost their own money. The breach could also lead to
severe economic, social and medical impact on the client.
The respondents felt that there may not be any direct association of computers in
these crimes; however this would be the case when trust accounts become
computerised or when electronic conveyancing is introduced.
Case study and survey data emphasised that a trust account is vulnerable to
internal and external threats if adequate security measures are not taken. Trust
account regulators mentioned that instances of breaches have a negative impact
on clients, law firms and legal practitioners.
4. CONCLUSION
The findings from multiple data sources reveal the urgent need to adopt
administrative and technological security controls, and information security
policies and procedures. The cooperation of all staff from management level
downwards is needed to communicate these policies. These issues were
highlighted by the respondents in their suggestions. One overall finding is the fact
that law firms were not familiar with the up to-date technology available to
combat computer crime. Lack of monitoring of computer systems and inadequate
access control to corporate databases were the main concerns in safeguarding the
data. The literature review in section 1 expressed the importance of backup, data
monitoring and business continuity plans to restore the business in the event of
any disaster. It was concluded that awareness of computer crime among the law
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firms was not prominent. Hence, security awareness training for the law firms
would play a major role in preparing for better security practices.
Trust account authorisation procedure from the case study and survey noted that
there is not a standardised rule about the nomination of and number of signatories
for trust account cheques. In some cases, electronic money transactions in trust
accounts were carried out by the administrative staff. These procedures need to be
standardised in all the law firms with the help of the Law Society of South
Australia. According to the suggestions received from the respondents, there are
a few dubious areas that are prominent in trust account operations which have to
be addressed by policy makers.
Lack of resources in smaller firms places too much responsibility on one person.
In such situations, misusing power and authority for personal gain becomes very
common. Management controls such as specifying the duties of each individual
and segregation of power would minimise such mishandlings.
Trust account fraud is not limited to the individual. There are possibilities of using
trust account frauds in other major crimes such as money laundering, drug
trafficking and the financing of terrorist organisations. Therefore, protecting trust
accounts from any fraud needs to be addressed through effective security
management.
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